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by force, however, one wishes von Hippel 's work included more dis-
cussion of how the prevailing political ideology of American admini-
strations may influence its selective choice of forceful intervention and 
help shape America's ultimate prospects for success. 
John Creed 
College of Charleston 
Ian Shapiro, Democratic Justice (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1999). 333 pp. 
Democracy & Trust, ed. Mark E. Warren (New York: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1999). 370 pp. 
Shapiro, Ian & Casiano Hacker-Cordon Democracy's Edges, ed. 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 297 pp. 
Democracy, Ian Shapiro and Casiano Hacker-Cord6n tell us, is a 
"flawed hegemon." Such a description suits our time, now more than a 
decade past the Velvet Revolution. With the fading of the end of the 
Cold War and the dawning of new challenges for democratic nations 
around the globe, the arrival of these three volumes ( each first pub-
lished in 1999) comes at a propitious time. Certainly the dilemmas that 
democratic theory evokes have been long apparent, but in many re-
spects it seems suitable that a decade should have passed since 1989 to 
allow some additional critical detachment from the euphoria of democ-
ratic victories in Europe. Where these studies coincide is on the ground 
of defining and exploring the difficulties of working within a democ-
ratic framework where we also acknowledge other--often, compet-
ing-values. Now that democracy bestrides the world stage with no 
competitors for legitimacy, more than ever we are well to explore the 
democratic dilemma critically and carefully. 
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Democratic Justice by Shapiro seems by its title to evoke John 
Rawls's A Theory of Justice or Michael Sandel's Liberalism and the 
Limits of Justice, though Shapiro is careful to distinguish his concep-
tion of justice ("democratic moral intuitions") from their conceptions. 
Nevertheless, Shapiro is engaged in an allied enterprise-to puzzle out 
of our pluralist circumstances a standard to account for the justice and 
rightness of democracy. His effort focuses on defining justice as a 
"semicontextual ideal," a "middle ground between those who seek to 
derive principles of justice from abstract argument and those who ap-
peal to the contingencies of context and history as the source of norma-
tive ideals" (25). This effort is related to a unique "life-cycle approach 
to social justice" that provides an organizational frame for Shapiro's 
book. The changing dynamics of power relationships over a human 
lifetime (principally between parents and children) elicit different con-
ditions of justice according to circumstances--even if a person 
throughout those experiences may regard justice as a constant. Justice 
in this paradigm is contextual and yet abstractly constant within the 
concrete experience of human beings. Hence, justice is a "semi-
contextual ideal." 
The balance of Shapiro's book develops this argument within four 
zones of the life cycle (justice applied to children, adults, work, and 
end-of-life issues). Throughout his focus remains on the challenge of 
bringing democracy and justice into harmony. Shapiro orients himself 
within a consteUation of Rawls's political liberalism (understanding 
justice "politically, not metaphysically"), and Walzer's and Maclntyre's 
"contextualist" approaches. He is careful to distinguish democratic jus-
tice from these approaches and from "foundational political commit-
ments" to emphasize that his conception is a "third way" that will 
"quell-and even draw on-understandable fears of the organized 
power of others" (28-29). This carefully drawn ground is admittedly the 
only reasonable place left for a democratic theorist to start, yet it is 
fraught with dangers that Shapiro cannot quite elude. 
Shapiro's life-cycle approach to questions of social justice is per-
haps most appropriate and most problematic where he comes to the 
heart of contemporary political debates about justice questions in his 
chapter on "Life's Ending." Here Shapiro asserts that "Life's ending 
mirrors its beginning," finding in this truth a "sequence of autonomy 
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and dependence" that brings the life cycle back to its beginning in a 
child's dependence on parental care (196). Here Shapiro comes to the 
core of our problem (he acknowledges in this chapter that "the stakes 
are higher" [197)), and it is here that questions emerge concerning the 
durability of democratic justice. The chapter offers a detailed medita-
tion on euthanasia scenarios, dwelling on the responsibility and obliga-
tions of physicians and family members to preserve life, and focusing 
on insulating terminally-ill individuals from pressures to end their lives 
for the convenience of those around them ("Proponents of democratic 
justice should be greatly concerned that a terminally ill person not be 
forced or manipulated into the decision to end his or her life" [229]). 
The chapter ends by "endorsing the conclusion that majority decisions 
should not stop a person from deciding to end his or her life" (229), a 
conclusion that exposes the difficulties attending this project. In the 
consideration of this moral issue-one that centers on the value and 
autonomy of human lives in a singular way-Shapiro's rubric is not 
democratic justice but individual autonomy. Context, as he has con-
structed it, has dropped out of the picture with an appeal to a more ab-
stract justice, unbounded by contextual considerations. Further, it is a 
principle of autonomy not far removed from a Kantian or Rawlsian 
conception according to which terminally-ill patients must be free from 
all coercion by their families, by their physicians, and by their fellow 
citizens in order to obtain relief despite any value the state or anyone 
else may place on their lives. 
These considerations may do only minimal damage to Shapiro's 
carefully crafted argument of a sernicontextual ideal, since he recog-
nizes that democracy is at some point bounded by justice (and vice-
versa). The fact that life's ending-surely, an extreme circumstance -
exposes a moment where democracy is ill-suited to making decisions 
may vindicate the wisdom of Shapiro's hedging democracy and justice 
against each other. Then again, it is fair to wonder why individual 
autonomy cannot trump democratic claims in other circumstances as 
well. Shapiro argues that death is irrevocable, and therefore life-ending 
decisions merit special terms. However, death is not life's only irrevo-
cable or high-stakes moment, and the arguments that remove democ-
racy from that decision-making process may well prove useful 
elsewhere. 
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At the same time, it is not altogether clear that justice is the control-
ling paradigm where Shapiro asserts the autonomy of the terminally-ill 
patient against the pressures of democracy, expertise, or other exoge-
nous factors. If justice is backstopping these arguments, it is not clear 
how this justice is to be defined beyond the idiosyncratic preferences of 
the individual. Surely it is not defined by the state, nor is it defined by 
communities or the voluntary associations that accumulate around what 
John Rawls has called "comprehensive doctrines" and others call reli-
gious traditions. Instead Shapiro's arguments here bear the fingerprints 
of liberal arguments for individualism, an arena that may presuppose 
conceptions of justice but hardly indisputable or verifiable ones. If this 
is so, then Shapiro's arguments have not eluded the "indeterminate con-
troversy" in which liberalism also is mired (7). 
None of this is to diminish Shapiro's accomplishments in asserting 
the place of democracy alongside liberalism as arranging political insti-
tutions around a shared conception of justice rooted in the dignity of 
individuals who have the capacity to make decisions for themselves. 
The historical significance of democracy and liberalism lies in their 
debt to that dignity as a source of the legitimacy they enjoy, even if that 
dignity gives rise to a pluralism that makes justice impossible to define. 
Shapiro's book deserves to rest alongside Rawls's struggles with liber-
alism and justice, not so much for the answers it provides (like Rawls) 
as for the quality of the questions it raises. 
Democracy and Trust explores a different problematic characteristic 
of democracy. Mark Warren has assembled a collection of essays at-
tempting to describe the "paradoxical" relationship between democracy 
and trust by exploring such themes as trust in government, trust among 
citizens, and trust within voluntary associations. The problem here re-
mains one of pluralism. At once we are confronted with the "democ-
ratic innovation" that "in many relationships trust is misplaced or 
inappropriate" (I) despite the fact that democracy cannot "do without 
trust'' (2). The touchstone once again is liberal political institutions 
built on an absence of trust in the mechanisms of political power and 
those who control them. The challenge in this volume is to "harness" 
the "advantages of trust'' (19) for democratic political systems. 
The volume's catalog of neoconservative, rational choice, and de-
liberative approaches to building and actualizing trust within a democ-
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ratic framework will be familiar to most readers. It is for that reason, 
that the collection of these essays serves a useful pwpose by organizing 
the materials topically and framing debates in a sensible way. Perhaps 
the two most provocative dilemmas that the volume presents are found 
in its very beginning and its very end in essays by Russell Hardin ("Do 
we want trust in government?") and Clause Offe ("How can we trust 
our fellow citizens?") about the desirability of trust in a democratic 
system, and between Jean Cohen ("Trust, voluntary association, and 
workable democracy") and Rom Harre ("Trust and its surrogates") on 
the persistent question about the role of civil society. 
Russell Hardin raises worthy questions about the role of trust in a 
democracy on the ground of "mistaken inference" (24) and the com-
plexities of modem governance: can a citizen ever be knowledgeable 
enough to trust government responsibly, or is ''trust in government" 
merely an exercise in self-deception? Hardin defines trust as "to some 
extent" delegating power and responsibility to another party (35). He 
notes, echoing very familiar liberal sentiments about why government's 
power must be limited, that, "if we empower government enough to 
allow it to accomplish the tasks we delegate to it, we likely empower it 
to go well beyond our delegations" (35-36). 
Where Hardin stands back from any moral content in trust and 
views it from a coolly objective perspective, Clause Offe is concerned 
deeply with "deficits" of trust in contemporary regimes as a failure of 
institutions to create confidence in its rules, values, and norms. "Trust ," 
he tells us, "is the belief concerning the action that is to be expected 
from others" (47), and be notes the main difficulty with "a modern po-
litical community'' is the fact that civic trust no longer can be "built 
upon actual acquaintance, [or] communal belonging'' as they were in 
the city-states of the past (61). The dilemma becomes one of creating 
the confidence in fellow citizens and institutions that can produce salu-
tary political behavior in the atomistic environment of contemporary 
politics. The Offe essay also points to a signal strength of this volume 
in the way that it interlocks with Cohen's and Harre's concerns about 
developing civil society as a source of trust without which modem re-
gimes cannot thrive. 
More than for its internal cohesion and a lively debate, however, 
Democracy & Trust also is significant for taking up the question of 
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democracy in relation to the too-often overlooked dimension of trust. 
Warren attributes the volume's origin to a "short conference" at 
Georgetown University about democracy and trust, and it should be 
hoped that this collection of essays will not signal the end of this ave-
nue ofresearch which yet may yield much more fruit about the "endur-
ing embarrassment of democratic theory" found at Democracy's Edges, 
the title of another edited volume whose nature and approach lends 
itself to consideration alongside Democracy & Trust. 
Ian Shapiro and Casiano Hacker-Cord6n begin their volume bluntly 
with reassuring frankness that democratic theory is "impotent when 
faced with questions about its own scope" (I). This amounts to an ad-
mission of the truth that underlies all three of these volumes, and De-
mocracy s Edges is valuable for its effort to explore this truth candidly 
and without making any overt effort to resolve definitively the dilemma 
it expresses. The volume is organized into two sections, "Outer Edges" 
that concerns itself with the boundaries of democratic theory and the 
place of democracy on the world stage as a symbol of political legiti-
macy, while "Inner Edges" addresses questions of representation and 
democratic legitimacy. 
On the international side, Democracy s Edges embraces the full 
range of democratic crises (the precarious state of international institu-
tions, the danger of ecological catastrophe, the moral challenges of 
globalism), while democracy's inner edges are imaginatively charted 
through explorations of "enclave-seeking behavior" rooted in the poli-
tics of identity and the · delicate balancing of varying self-expressions 
and conceptions of the good against one another. This is surely familiar 
territory, particularly in view of Shapiro's Democratic Justice (he also 
has contributed a thoughtful essay here on "Group aspirations and de-
mocratic politics" that evokes Democratic Justice), but its familiarity 
does not prevent this comprehensive volume from making an impact. 
Ifwe take Shapiro's and Hacker-Cord6n's introductory statement at 
face-value then the essays in Democracys Edges each face a clear chal-
lenge in their explorations of democratic theory. Whether the authors 
are exploring outer edges or inner edges, the guiding principle must be 
the effort to restore some articulateness to democracy about its scope 
and legitimacy. Robert A. Dahl explores this problem thoughtfully in 
relation to international organizations which are "not and probably can-
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not be ... democrac[ies]" (19), and instead represent "autonomous hier-
archies" possessing "greatly superior knowledge and virtue," "defi-
nitely superior to democracy" and "useful" for political purposes (32-
33). David Held considers globalization and the proposition that "the 
nature and prospects of the democratic polity need re-examination" 
(105). Held's re-imagined polity would strip sovereignty away "from 
the idea of fixed borders and territories" and construct a system of 
"cosmopolitan governance" wherein "people would come to enjoy mul-
tiple citizenships .. . in the diverse political communities which signifi-
cantly affect them" (107). On the side of inner edges, Jeffrey C. Isaac, 
Matthew F. Filner, and Jason C. Bivens respond to "the conflict of iden-
tities" within democratic politics and particularly in how the rise of the 
American Christian Right has challenged democratic theory for the 
"thinness" of its claim to legitimacy, seeking to "democratically en-
gage[)" the discourse of the New Christian Right (256) . In acknowl-
edged contrast with Isaac, Filner and Bivens, Courtney Jung critiques 
the notion that democracy can be an inoculation against the divisions 
tolerated by liberalism among differing conceptions of the good. 
All of the essays in this text, including those mentioned here, strug-
gle with questions similar to those raised in Democratic Justice, but 
what is striking is bow in so many ways the question returns once again 
to trust. Trust and the imprecise character of human knowledge of 
goods form a different sort of "veil of ignorance" beyond which neither 
liberal nor democratic politics has yet penetrated. The uncertainty that 
emerges from viewing democratic theory from its outer and inner edges 
further vindicates the location of trust as a critical area for study of de-
mocratic theory if conflicts between authority and democracy are to 
move beyond the suspicious glances that continue to be exchanged be-
tween those who look for a moral authority beyond democracy ( as Dahl 
does) and those who seem comfortable that democracy can settle its 
own problems (such as Isaac, Filner and Bivens) using tools native to 
its history and necessary procedures . Yet bow can trust emerge within 
the circumstances of pluralism, and how are we to move beyond the 
nagging recurrence of utility as a standard for applying democratic the-
ory or hierarchical moral authority? 
Each of these volumes is thought-provoking and worthwhile read-
ing, yet finally none engages John Dewey's observation that, "Democ-
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racy is a form of government only because it is a form of moral and 
spiritual association ." Beyond the lack of trust , beyond utility, beyond 
democratic deficits, beyond competing conceptions of the good lies a 
foundational and pre-political consideration that emerges first from 
common, lived experiences of rationality, and from shared hopes for 
dignity. Within this frame democratic theory need not be sheltered from 
( or even hedged against) a priori considerations, but rather depends on 
moral and spiritual considerations that precede all political arrange-
ments. All of the authors collected in these volumes point toward this 
truth, yet the work of democratic theory that fully avails itself of those 
considerations has not yet been written. 
Steven P. Millies 
University of South Carolina-Aiken 
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These three diverse books ask interesting questions about the status 
of women internationally. Feinman examines a split in the feminist 
movement between feminist anti-militarists and liberal feminists who 
seek equal opportunities within the military. Kelson and DeLaet com-
pile a fascinating collection of essays that analyze the experience of 
women from primarily developing countries who immigrate to the de-
veloped nations of Australia, Canada, Israel, and the United States. 
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